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Abstract:  
 
Most of the studies on auditors’ perceptions towards the effectiveness of the international 
standard on auditing 240 Red Flags (RF) were conducted in developed economies.  
 
This research, therefore, fills the gap by aiming to determine whether RF can be helpful for 
Lebanon certified public accountant (LCPA) working in auditing firms by detecting 
fraudulent financial reporting (FFR).  
 
Data were collected using a questionnaire that was distributed to a random sample of 130 
LCPA. The results support that there is a positive significant association between pressures 
and FFR occurrence in Lebanon.  
 
However, there were no support for opportunities and attitudes to be associated with FFR 
occurrence. Moreover, the findings provide a strong evidence that ISA 240 RF for FFR can 
help external auditors in detecting material mis-statement (MM) due to fraud in Lebanon.  
 
Therefore, the current research recommends LCPA working in the audit firms in Lebanon to 
focus their efforts more on high quality RF, which will in turn facilitate fraud detection in the 
financial statements.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A considerable increase in the reporting of financial frauds and subsequent business 
collapses led to worries about the accuracy of corporate financial reports. These 
worries have led to updating the auditing standards and laws to protect the investors 
and to push the regulators and auditors to prevent and detect such frauds (Lou and 
Wang, 2009). Business fraud had received remarkable and increasing attention from 
public, auditors, and regulators (Kassem and Higson, 2012). One of the most 
important theories that interpreted why violators perpetrate fraud is Cressey’s 
theory. This theory was configured to “fraud triangle” (Kassem and Higson, 2012). 
This fraud triangle specifies pressure/incentive to commit fraud, opportunity to 
perform the fraud, or attitude/rationalization to vindicate fraud action. Such cases 
stands for “fraud-risk factors” (Lou and Wang, 2009). 
 
FFR increases recently and this may lead to MM in the financial reports and harms 
the stockholders and creditors. Thus, the auditors should anticipate the probability of 
FFR occurrence (Kirkos et al., 2007). The AICPA acknowledges clearly the 
responsibilities of the auditors concerning fraud detection (Cullinan and Sutton, 
2002). 
 
Hence, auditors should work as detectives to investigate the validity of the evidences 
and the faithfulness of financial reports by depending on several techniques and 
procedures to detect the manipulations. One of these techeniques is depending on RF 
that can work as indicators of FFR. These RF are proxies for the existence of 
fraudulent activity; however, they do not assert the existence of fraud, they must be 
examined to affirm the presence of the fraudulent activity (Yücel, 2013). 
 
Due to the importance of RF, the global accounting institutions depend on them in 
their rules and regulations because they provide signs about fraudulent actions. 
Lately, the international standard on auditing (ISA) No. 240 recommmends fro 
auditors to depend on 41 RF in auditing the financial reports to detect fraud. 
(Hegazy and Kassem, 2010). 
 
However, as reported by Rezaee et al. (2003) many studies indicated that those 
auditing standards and updated regulations have not improve the auditor’s ability to 
discover fraud. Therefore, it is not clear to what extent the auditing regulations and 
standards had influenced the auditor’s ability in preventing and documenting 
situations where fraud had been discovered (Hassink et al., 2010). Although the 
mentioned standards aimed to diminish the expectation gap by increasing the 
responsibility of the auditors in detecting fraud; however, the expectation gap 
remains (Hegazy and Kassem, 2010). Thus, it is significant to manage the risk of 
fraud through identifying the fraud risk elements depending on the fraud triangle.  
 
There is little research linking the frauds in the financial statements with fraud 
Cressey’s theory, although it is generally accepted by accounting academics, 
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practitioners, and several regulatory agencies (Roden et al., 2016). Therefore, filling 
the expectation gap through investigating whether the ISA 240 RF related to 
fraudulent financial statements will help external auditors in discovering fraud MM 
is needed. 
 
Therefore, this research aims to identify a set of fraud risk factors, which then well 
known as the “fraud triangle” as well as investigate the roles of ISA 240 RF in 
aiding external auditors in detecting MM, and that through external auditor’s 
assessment of 41 RF while auditing the financial reports to discover the fraud in the 
financial statements. 
 
Thus, in order to achieve the objectives of this research, two questions are 
developed. (1) What are the fraud risk elements proxies for pressure/incentive; 
opportunity and attitude/rationalization? In addition, (2) do ISA 240 RF related to 
FFR aid external auditors in discovering MM due to fraud? The outcomes of this 
research are significant for users of financial reports, academics, and standard 
setters. If the theory of Cressey is beneficial, then the usage of fraud risk factors 
included in ISA (240) may improve the confidence in the audited financial reports. 
In addition, the information gained from this research could benefit audit profession 
and audit standard setters by reflecting the importance of RF list to the external 
auditors. Finally, this research would support academies and researchers who have 
an interest in this field of research through suggesting further future research 
opportunities.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
When the external pressure ascended, the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) issued in December 2009 the ISA (240) “The Auditor’s 
Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements” (Chong, 
2013). This standard focuses on the external auditor’s concerns of the risk that may 
lead to frauds and errors and illustrates the arguments on the limitations that impede 
the abilities of the auditors in detecting errors and frauds, especially management 
fraud. In addition, it focuses on distinguishing between fraud committed by 
management or employees; it also concentrates on the various discussions related to 
fraudulent financial reporting (Kirkos et al., 2007). 
 
ISA (240) documented three cases that generally lead to MM associated with fraud 
risk:  
(1) incentives/pressures;  
(2) opportunities;  
(3) attitudes/rationalizations.  
 
These cases are named as “fraud-risk factors.” In spite, these factors do not 
absolutely lead to the presence of fraud, they often presented in situations where 
fraud occurs (Lou and Wang, 2009). Next, the researchers will provide a brief 
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descreption for the three components of fraud trangle as well auditing standards and 
auditors’ responsibilities for detecting material fraud. 
 
2.1 Pressures/Incentives  
 
Pressure may emerge because of external statuses as industry, economy, or firm is 
operating situations that loom up the financial stability of the customer. In addition, 
managers may be under big pressure to accomplish and meet the anticipated sales or 
profitability goals, or to meet the anticipations of outside parties, such as 
stockholders, creditors, and analysts (Lou and Wang, 2009). Prior studies have 
divided pressures into four categories financial pressures, immoral (vice) pressures, 
job- linked pressures and other pressures. The studies reported that 95 percent of all 
frauds are related to financial and immoral pressures.  
 
According to ISA 240, there are four main kinds of pressure, which may cause fraud 
in the financial reports. They are exterior pressure, financial stability, the personal 
financial conditions of the managers, and reaching the financial goals (ISA 240, 
2015). Previous studies have indicated that there is a positive association between 
pressures and FFR. For instance, Lou and Wang (2009) revealed that managers 
might be under pressure that lead to the commitment of fraud in the financial reports 
if the financial stability and/or profitability are menaced by industry, economy, or 
firm operating situation. Suyanto (2009) demonstrated that managers usually 
manipulate financial reports to meet the requirements of the contract terms.  
 
Therefore, it is expected to have a positive and significant association between 
financial tribulation and the presence of FFR. Skousen et al. (2009) reported that 
there is big pressure on management to reach the financial goals settled by the 
parties responsible for governance, involving profitability goals. Putra (2014) argued 
that if the managers possess large financial stake in a company, their personal 
financial status might be menaced by the company’s financial achievements. As the 
managers’ ownership in the firm increases, their personal financial wealth will rely 
on the performance of the firm. Then the managers will be more involved in 
committing accounting fraud to raise the value of the firm’s stock to improve their 
personal wealth. Hence, based on the arguments of the previous studies, the first 
hypothesis is developed as follow:  
 
H1: There is a positive significant association between pressures and FFR 
occurrence in Lebanon. 
 
2.2 Opportunities  
 
Fraud opportunities rise because of the presence of inherent risk in the industry. 
Besides, the type and degree of firm’s operations complexity give opportunities to 
get involved in FFR. The case will be even worse in the presence of weak internal 
control system-especially inefficacious controls over the accounting and information 
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systems- a commanding management pattern, and a shortage of segregation of duties 
among the staff (Chong, 2013). Albrecht et al. (2006) argued that opportunity is 
identified as averting punishments. Previous researchers documented six main 
elements that increase the opportunities for a person to perpetrate frauds in a firm. 
Deficiency of controls established for preventing or detecting fraudulent acts, 
deficiency in judging and measuring the performance, failure to punish fraud 
committers, inability to access to data and information, incapacity, unawareness and 
carelessness and shortage in fraud audit.  
 
On the other hand, ISA 240 categorizes the opportunities that may cause FFR into 
four classes. These encompasses the type of industry, inefficacious oversighting and 
ineffective monitoring, firm structure, and deficiency in internal controls. Previous 
studies have indicated that there is a positive association between opportunities and 
FFR. For instance, Chen and Elder (2007) argued that there will more risk if there is 
inefficacious monitoring and oversighting of management due to dominance of 
management by a one person or a group in the absent of recompensating controls.  
 
Companies with inefficacious monitoring would facilitate the CEO violation, and 
violation would lead to probable conflict of interest conditions that would decrease 
the stockholders’ wealth. Moreover, Chen and Elder (2007) anticipated that 
companies with higher ratio of cash flow rights compared to control rights would be 
more probable to be involved in frauds related to financial statements, because 
concentrated ownership expedite the opportunism behavior of managers in issues 
related to financial statements. Skousen et al. (2009) mentioned that the type of 
company’s industry could provide the opportunity to commit fraud in the financial 
statements. However, the impact of this factor on the occurrence of fraud is 
subjective and not easy to be verified. Lou and Wang (2009) asserted that 
efficacious internal control system can retain the quality of the company’s financial 
reports and prohibit fraud occurrence. Putra (2014) demonstrated that the effect of 
this factor on the financial statements can be revealed in the accounts that depend 
much on the estimation and have subjective nature, such us inventory valuation. 
Consequently, based on the arguments of the previous studies, the second hypothesis 
is formulated as follow:  
 
H2: There is a positive significant association between level of opportunities and 
FFR occurrence in Lebanon. 
 
2.3 Attitudes/Rationalizations  
 
Those engaged in fraud issues related to the financial statements usually rationalize 
their deceitful actions to be harmonized with their own code of ethics. Certain 
persons have attitudes, personalities, or ethical behavior that permit them to 
intentionally perpetrate fraudulent acts (Suyanto, 2009). Mostly any fraud includes 
the factors of rationalization. Most often, the committers of this type of fraud 
rationalize the roguery of their actions. The fraud committers usually have joint 
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rationalizations to justify their acts. There are several reasons for attitudes that lead 
to fraud. For instance, inefficacious communication; failure of fulfillment, 
enhancement, or execution of the firm’s ethical standards; management’s aggressive 
involvement in choosing the accounting methods or sharing in the determination of 
important estimations (Chong, 2013). 
 
In fact, the auditor’s independence is considered a vital factor to achieve qualified 
financial reports. Regarding the role of external auditor on decreasing fraud, Chen 
and Elder (2007) mentioned that companies that frequently switch the external 
auditor are more probable to commit frauds in the financial reports. Moreove, 
Suyanto (2009) considers the sufficiency of financial reports disclosure a signal of 
the firm’s cabpability to keep on as a going concern. Hence, based on the arguments 
of the previous studies, the research postulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: There is a positive significant association between rationalizations and FFR 
occurrence in Lebanon. 
 
2.4 Auditing Standards and Auditors’ Responsibilities for Detecting Material 
Fraud 
 
The primary step for discovering fraud is to know where to begin performing 
control. Moreover, identifying the elements that lead to fraud and consequently 
realizing the significant areas to accomplish elaborated assessment through 
anticipating the most risky accounts is an effective method to discover fraud. In this 
level, doubts and skepticism of the external auditor are actually significant. In 
addition, the external auditor should assess all procedures with skepticism whilst 
detecting frauds. The auditor should always believe that all records and financial 
reports may contain deceitful applications and any document can be forged. It is not 
a case of mistrust but an exigency for examination. External auditors should keep 
track of several indicators (RF) and apply different ways in discovering 
manipulations (Yücel, 2013).  
 
Price Waterhouse explained RF as potential symptoms existing within the firm’s 
business environment that would indicate a higher risk of an intentional 
misstatement of the financial statements (Yücel, 2013). For instance, Yücel (2013) 
suggested the usage of RF in detecting fraud detection; he argued that identifying the 
significant alert signals must aid the external auditors in performing better 
assessment of fraud risk. He also stated that whilst the present and suggested 
auditing standards ask external auditors to perform this assessment and evaluation, 
they do not supply the auditors with guidance that displays the relative significance 
of certain signals. Moyes et al. (2013) stated that external auditors should determine 
the actions that are considered as fraud risk factors or RF, which can point out to the 
pressures or incentives to perpetrate fraud, attitudes or rationalizations to vindicate 
perpetrating fraud, and opportunities to commit fraud. They argued that the risks of 
not discovering the significant misstatements due to fraud are considered more than 
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the risks of not discovering significant misstatements due to errors. Kassem and 
Higson (2012) asserted that the ISA (240) encourages the external auditors to take in 
consideration both the exterior and interior elements that influence the firm and may 
generate pressure for managers or employees to do fraud, form the opportunity for 
fraud to be committed, and create an environment that enables managers or 
employees to rationalize perpetrating fraud. Thus, based on these discussions, the 
following hypothesis is postulated: 
  
H4: ISA 240 RF for FFR can aid external auditors in detecting MM due to fraud in 
Lebanon. 
 
3 Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Research Population and Research Sample  
 
The field study population is the LCPA working in the audit firms in Lebanon, 
which constitute of about 1300 LCPA. The sample of the field study is 10% of the 
population 130 questionnaires were distributed among LCPA working in these 
firms. 
 
3.2 Data Collection and Measurement of Variables 
 
The researchers used a questionnaire as a method for collecting data. The five-point 
Linkert scale is used in the design of the questionnaire, which is the research 
instrument. The questionnaire was developed after reviewing the recent literature 
regarding ISA (240) RF. The measurement variables used in this research - 
Incentives/Pressures, Opportunities, Attitudes/Rationalizations (independent 
variables) and FFR occurrence in Lebanon (dependent variable) - were five point 
Likert-scale with 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (neutral), 4 (agree) and 5 
(strongly agree). The questionnaire consists of four parts. Part I contain questions on 
the demographic characteristic of the respondents. Part II consists of 41 questions in 
three sections. Section A consists of 12 questions on the Incentives/Pressures to 
commit fraud; section B consists of 15 questions on the Opportunities to commit 
fraud; section C consists of 14 questions on Attitudes/Rationalizations when 
committing fraud. Part III consists of one question about FFR occurrence in 
Lebanon. The last part consists of three questions on whether ISA 240 RF for FFR 
can help external auditors in detecting MM due to fraud. 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
 
4.1 Reliability and Construct Validity 
 
Prior to research variable measurement, the draft of measurement instrument was 
evaluated for content validity. To provide content validity, the questionnaire was 
revived and pre-tested, requesting the advice and recommendation from the experts. 
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Five professors from the accounting field from Lebanese universities were requested 
to participate for the validity content. Any comments were used to improve the 
wording and flow of the terms in the questionnaire.  
 
The Cronbach’s alpha values for the three independent variables range from 0.539 to 
0.771 exceeding the minimum alpha of 0.5. Thus, the constructs measures are 
considered reliable. The results of reliability testing are presented accordingly in the 
Table (1) below. 
 
Table 1. Results of Reliability Analysis of Red Flags 
 # of Red Flags  Cronbach α 
Incentives 12 .710 
Opportunities 15 .771 
Attitudes 14 .539 
Source: SPSS (20)               
 
The researchers were used the mean to rank all RF for FFR according to their 
relative importance based on LCPA. The most important RF in incentives were 
“Fast growth or abnormal profitability in the firms within the same industry” 
(4.3981), “High competition or market demarcation, along with decreasing margins” 
(4.3883) and “High sensitivity to fast changes (i.e. the changes in interest rates, 
product obsolescence, or technology) (4.2718). The most important RF in 
opportunities were “Difficulty in recognizing the organization or persons who have 
controlling interest in the firm” (4.3981), “Important operations took place across 
global boundaries in countries where different business environments exist” (4.3883) 
and “High complicated organizational structure with unusual legal activities or 
managerial lines of authority” (4.2913). The most important RF in attitudes were 
“Repeating attempts by management to vindicate inadequate accounting related to 
materiality issues” (4.3981), “The practice done by management to commit to 
creditors, analysts, and other parties to reach excessive or unrealistic expectations” 
(4.3883) and “Restrictions on the auditor, which limit his/her access to information, 
or impede his/her ability to communicate efficaciously with parties charged with 
governance” (4.3592). 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of each variables included in this 
research (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Incentives 1.33 3.50 4.83 4.11 .35 
Opportunities 1.40 3.47 4.87 4.11 .33 
Attitudes  1.14      3.36 4.50 3.89 .26 
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Fraud 3.00      2.00 5.00 3.85 .83 
Source: SPSS (20)  
                                  
Table 2 shows that the average of all variables range from 3.85 to 4.11 and the SD 
range from .26 to .83. This means that all the respondents are agree that the 41 
statements are related to ISA 240 RF. 
  
4.3 Correlation Analysis 
 
Table (3) shows a significant positive correlation between fraud and pressures as 
well as between fraud and opportunities. More specifically Pearson's correlation 
coefficients between fraud and pressures as well between fraud and opportunities 
stand respectively at 39 % and 31% and they are significant at 1%. Moreover, this 
table shows strong significant correlations between independent variables with each 
other.  
 
Table 3. Correlation Analysis 
 Pressures Opportunities Attitudes Fraud 
Pressures 1    
opportunities .894** 1   
Attitudes .832** .940** 1  
Fraud .390** .309** .192 1 
Source: SPSS (20) 
 
4.4 Regression Analysis 
 
In order to accomplish the main objective of this research, multiple regression 
analysis was conducted.  
 
Table 4. Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .486a .237 .213 .73896 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Pressures, Opportunities, Attitudes 
Source: SPSS (20) 
 
The findings of the model indicate R of 0.486, R square of 0.237 and adjusted R 
square of 0.213. This implies that 23.7% of the variations in fraud is explained by 
the independent variables of the research.  
 
Table 5. ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
  1  Regression 16.756 3 5.585 10.229 .000
a 
Residual 54.059 99 .546   
Total 70.816 102    
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Predictors: (Constant), Att, Press, opp 
Dependent Variable: Fraud 
Source: SPSS (20) 
 
The ANOVA findings from Table (5) indicate F calculated of 10.229 and p-value of 
.000; this is an indicator that the overall regression model was significant. 
 
Table 6. Coefficient 
Model Unstandardized   
Coefficients 
 Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B  Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.758 1.206     2.287    .024 
Pressures 1.280 .473 .532    2.708    .008 
Opportunities 1.496 .798 .601    1.875    .064 
Attitudes -2.655 .842 -.816 -3.153   .002 
Source: SPSS (20) 
 
Table (6) shows that the coefficient of pressures has the positive expected sign 
(1.280) and it is significant (.008). This indicates that pressures is significantly 
positively influencing the FFR occurrence in Lebanon. Hence, hypothesis 1 is 
accepted. The coefficient of opportunities is positive (1.496) and insignificant (.064). 
This reveals that there exists a positive influence of opportunities on the FFR 
occurrence in Lebanon, but it is not statistically significant. Consequently, 
hypothesis 2 is rejected. The coefficient of attitudes has the negative unexpected 
sign (-2.655) and it is significant (.002). This signifies that attitude is significantly 
negatively influencing the FFR occurrence in Lebanon. Hence, hypothesis 3 is 
rejected. 
 
4.5 One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
 
According to Table (7), p- value is 0.000 (significant). Thus, the null hypothesis has 
been rejected. Consequently, there is a sufficient evidence at 0.05 level to conclude 
that the median of IAS 240 differs significantly from 3. Hence, hypothesis 4 is 
accepted. 
 
Table 7. One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Test Sig. Decision 
Median of IAS 
240 = 3 
One-Sample 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test 
0.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
Asymptotic Significances are displayed. The significant level is 0.05 
Source: SPSS (20) 
 
5. Research Limitation and Recommendation 
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This research aims to identify a set of fraud risk factors that had been adopted by 
ISA (240) as well to investigate the roles of ISA 240 RF in aiding external auditors 
in Lebanon in detecting MM in the financial statements. To achieve the intended 
objective, the research was based on a self- administered questionnaire of 41-RF. By 
employing multivariate OLS model, the finding of the research shows that there is a 
positive significant association between pressures and FFR occurrence in Lebanon. 
However, there were no support for opportunities and attitudes to be associated with 
FFR occurrence in Lebanon. Moreover, the finding provides a strong evidence that 
ISA 240 RF for FFR can aid external auditors in detecting MM due to fraud in 
Lebanon. Hence, the list of specific RF for FFR that were used in this research can 
be used in conjunction with SAS 99 RF to enhance external auditors’ ability in 
detecting FFR. Therefore, it is believed that these findings contribute to the 
academicians to further spread out the research in this area, users of financial 
reports, audit profession and audit standard setters by reflecting the importance of 
RF list to the external auditors.  
 
The research is not without limitations. The researchers were not able to get more 
than 130 LCPA working in the audit firms in Lebanon out of 1300 LCPA to fill in 
the questionnaire and thus the results cannot be generalized to all LCPA working in 
Lebanon. Future research is needed to increase the sample size to generalize the 
results. This may provide additional insights into the external validity of the 
findings. The current research examined the RF for FFR based on a questionnaire; 
future research should test them using other methods like experiments or interviews. 
The researchers tried to list every possible RF for FFR but certainly, there can be 
other RF in the literature that are not mentioned in this research. Thus, future 
research should be more directed toward listing other RF for FFR. Therefore, the 
current research recommends LCPA working in the audit firms in Lebanon to focus 
their efforts more on high quality RF, which will in turn facilitate fraud detection in 
the financial statements.  
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